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Abstract: This paper reassesses the relationship between social partnership and the broader Irish
policy process. What has developed may be conceptualised as “flexible network governance”. While
pay regulation may be less strongly institutionalised than in other countries with national-level
pay deals, social partnership has created networks for establishing and maintaining priorities
that matter to those involved in the process. These have not replaced conventional methods of
developing policy. Nor do they displace government prerogative: politics can trump partnership.
Social partnership is open to some criticism on grounds of both effectiveness and legitimacy. But
is has proven robust to date on the core issues it deals with.
I INTRODUCTION
A
fter almost twenty years, social partnership is now an established part of
the political landscape in Ireland. This paper reassesses the relationship
between social partnership and the broader policy process. It argues that
while the pay regulation process may be less watertight than in some
countries with centralised pay deals, social partnership has created networks
for establishing and maintaining priorities that matter to both employers and
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conventional methods of developing policy, but they have generated new
networks of linkages through which issues can emerge into the political
process. Although these networks are open to some criticism on grounds of
both effectiveness and legitimacy, the claim here is that they extend rather
than undermine democratic deliberative capacity.
What has evolved is a form of policy making that might be termed “flexible
network governance”. Social partnership has created a complex and flexible
network of bipartite and tripartite negotiating capabilities, policy working
groups, and consultative mechanisms. These typically involve direct
participation by civil servants as well as by unions, employers, and
representatives of the community sector of voluntary organisations, advocacy
groups, and special interest bodies with some form of statutory basis. But the
new feature of these arrangements is that there is also considerable fluidity
across all these activities, not only because they involve overlapping
personnel, but because they allow issues to be taken up or shelved, or passed
between groups. They allow for difficult problems to be uncoupled and dealt
with separately; they permit issues to be linked together for joint decision.
They constitute a shifting resource base of policy ideas and priorities that can
be taken up onto the government agenda.
For these reasons, the manner in which legislative issues are prioritised is
not easy to predict. The partnership working groups have no direct input to
the legislative process. Governments retain discretion about which issues to
prioritise at different times; and yet the preferences emanating from within
the partnership nexus create pressures and expectations which governments
may find it difficult to oppose. 
II PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL PARTNERSHIP
A variety of theoretical frameworks has been brought to bear on
interpreting the institutions, outcomes, and significance of social partnership.
During the 1980s and 1990s, the pay pacts that emerged in a number of
European countries threw up a new interpretive challenge for comparative
politics, and Ireland featured as one of the cases requiring explanation. These
pay pacts differed from the older welfare-state-building pay agreements of the
postwar decades (Streeck and Kenworthy, 2005). Free capital mobility and
growing foreign direct investment changed the terms of engagement with the
international economy across the advanced industrial societies (Weiss, 1998).
European integration processes, especially the adoption of the Euro, wrought
many changes in European countries’ fiscal and monetary strategies, and
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(Pèrez, 2002). The older kinds of solidarity between employees came under
great pressure, as sectoral differentiation created new incentives for unions to
make separate pay deals for their members; similarly, employers often found
economy-wide pay deals too onerous and pressed for greater responsiveness to
industry-level or company-level competitiveness conditions (Iversen, 1996;
Kinderman, 2005; Pontusson and Swenson, 1996). Yet the harsher conditions
of production and trade did not result in a general convergence on a neo-liberal
politics of trade union marginalisation (Kitschelt et al., 1999). Rather, we see
a continuing role for structures through which negotiated agreement on
economic and social policy is worked out. This has been labelled as
“competitive corporatism”, combining a “… search for elaborate equity-based
compromises and trade-offs” with “… new market-conforming policy mixes”
(Rhodes, 2001 pp. 165-6; Traxler, 2004). 
Giving this new kind of pay agreement a single title, however, does not
mean that the same kinds of institutions, or the same kinds of outcomes, are
in evidence in different countries. Domestic institutions matter greatly in
creating the terms of agreements, just as they do in other aspects of
adjustment to changing conditions in the international economy (Weiss, 2003).
National-level agreements gave way to sectoral deals in Denmark and
Sweden; company-level flexibility gained salience in German sectoral
agreements; and new national pay pacts emerged in countries that had not
previously been thought to have the organisational or institutional conditions
to support traditional neo-corporatism. Ireland features in this latter group,
along with countries as diverse as Spain and Italy, Finland, and Belgium
(Crouch and Streeck, 1997). 
The model of competitive corporatism is helpful in clarifying the
international comparability of what has happened in Ireland. But it still
leaves open the question of how it is to be evaluated. Many of the assessments
have tended to focus on the outcomes, whether distributive or political.
Teague, for example, concludes that the Irish case falls far short of the classic
model of social corporatism in which pay and welfare issues are progressed in
tandem (Teague, 1995). Authors such as Kieran Allen and Dennis O’Hearn
argue that the conflictual stance which they believe is proper to the role of
trade unions has been undermined. The unions have been incorporated into a
process which, in this view, subordinates their concerns to those of employers,
which the state then endorses (Allen, 2000; O’Hearn, 2003) – competitive
corporatism without the equity agenda, perhaps, which explains why these
authors can see no merit at all in union participation in social partnership. 
Other evaluations suggest positive-sum outcomes. Former Minister for
Finance, Ray MacSharry and Pádraic White, former chief executive of the
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success since the mid-1980s were fiscal stability and social partnership”
(MacSharry and White, 2000. p. 369). Income distribution data show a marked
rise in living standards for all income groups during the growth period that
started in the early to mid-1990s, and while the middle and top of the
distribution rose faster than the lower levels, the assessment is complicated by
considerations of the changing profile of economic activity and the changing
composition of the workforce (Nolan et al., 2002). Hard econometric evidence
has proven elusive, but the balance of economists’ probability is that social
partnership did play a role in managing rapid growth without producing sharp
dislocations (Honohan and Walsh, 2002; Ó Gráda, 2002). 
The implications of social partnership for the functioning of the political
system have been similarly contested. Séamus Ó Cinnéide has expressed
concern about the degree to which decision making may have moved outside
the control of elected politicians (Ó Cinnéide, 1999). But Rory O’Donnell, who
played a pivotal role as secretary of the National Economic and Social Council
(NESC) through several round of social partnership, argues that it improves
the quality of reflection on policy priorities. Not only do interest groups
understand others’ perspectives more fully, but they may also rethink their
own interests and even identities (O’Donnell and Thomas, 2002). In line with
similar developments in other European countries, this may facilitate a rapid
process of “policy learning” (Hemerijck and Schludi, 2000; Visser and
Hemerijck, 2000), which may in turn improve the quality of public
administration. 
This paper is not primarily concerned with evaluating the distributive
consequences of social partnership. It seeks rather to develop a framework for
understanding how the actors perceive their interests within this specific
institutional setting, and what the consequences are for the manner in which
political priorities are established. 
III FLEXIBLE NETWORK GOVERNANCE
Social partnership agreements extend across a broad range of policy
issues. At their core is the negotiation of a pay deal for both public and private
sectors. A whole array of macroeconomic, labour market, welfare and social
policy issues are negotiated alongside the pay deals. But the range of
theoretical interpretations and normative evaluations of social partnership
suggest that we may still lack a proper theory of the policy process that is
adequate to the political and structural contexts in which it is embedded. 
Social partnership might best be conceptualised as a new mode of network
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consultations on a specific topic, while a “policy network” might be said to exist
if the relationships were less structured and more diffuse, but still contained
within in a particular policy area (Rhodes, 1992; Rhodes, 1997; van Waarden,
1992). 
In Britain, policy networks are envisaged as rather static constellations of
interests clustered around discrete policy issues, and policy networks do not
appear to be interconnected (Marsh, 1998; Marsh and Rhodes, 1992). In more
clearly corporatist countries, where interest organisation is embedded in the
consultative process, the role of organised interests is more structured
(Steinmo, 1993). Fluid networks have become the norm in the politics of the
EU. But here too, policy networks tend to be confined to specific issue areas,
expert inputs tend to prevail, and there is a strong tendency toward
“government by committee” (Peterson, 2003). 
The Irish system, as it is developed over some twenty years since the late
1980s, looks rather different. Networks of interaction are not strongly
differentiated by policy area, but are linked into a dynamic process of political
deliberation. The working groups set up under social partnership agreements,
and the interactions between key leaders within the context of regular social
partnership review meetings, provide a powerful channel of communication
between the social partnership arena and the administrative and legislative
system. In order to progress onto the legislative agenda, issues must be taken
up by government; each policy initiative needs a ministerial sponsor if it is to
be worked on in detail, secure budgetary commitments, and move onto the
legislative timetable. 
What this suggests is a new kind of network governance. Networks of
interaction between government and organised interests are familiar in Irish
policy processes. Adshead, for example, discusses the insider role of
agricultural interests, bridging domestic and EU-level political processes
(Adshead, 1996); Collins found these relationships to be stronger in the
Republic than in Northern Ireland (Collins, 1995). What is different about
social partnership is the multi-dimensional nature of the issues it can cover.
But in addition, what is really distinctive about the social partnership
networks is the flexible way in which issues can be moved onto or off the
agenda, moved up or down in priority, moved into the legislative agenda, or
identified as a concern within a longer-term framework of policy development.
Social partnership processes provide a flexible vehicle through which unions,
employers, and the wider voluntary sector can raise issues of particular
concern to them. It also affords government a flexible method of addressing
emerging problems, testing possible policy responses, and building support for
subsequent legislative measures. 
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creative approach whereby institutions originally built for one purpose are
adapted and accommodated to meet other needs. In the area of industrial
policy, for example, the state agencies and especially the Industrial Develop-
ment Authority (IDA) built up complex two-way communication processes
with potential investor firms. Originally designed to funnel state supports, the
IDA became the pivotal institution in what Ó Riain terms the “flexible
developmental state”, or “developmenetal network state”, facilitating and
smoothing the linkages between global markets and local context in a new
kind of “glocalism” (Ó Riain, 2000; Ó Riain, 2004). Boyle analyses the evolu-
tion of the role of active labour market policy under the umbrella of FÁS,
whereby an agency originally designed with rather limited functions was able
to respond pliantly to the emergent need for lower-level skills training (Boyle,
2005). 
Network governance can allow actors in the political process to formulate
and advance their interests more effectively than might otherwise be possible.
“Networks as informal institutional settings help overcome collective action
problems” (van Kersbergen and van Waarden, 2004, p. 149). They can thereby
help to make public policy more effective, more efficient. 
But the original design of an institutional framework does shape what it
can do and how it can do it, even if the institutions are relatively informal and
the extent of participation quite broad. At its simplest we might argue that
“organisation makes a difference” (March and Olsen, 1984, p. 747). A more
nuanced view recognises “… the influence of institutions on the perceptions,
preferences, and capabilities of individual and corporate actors and on the
modes of their interaction… ” (Scharpf, 1997b, p. 38). Social partnership
originated in the late 1980s as a means of coordinating pay trends with
macroeconomic priorities, and labour market issues remain at the core of the
network. The boundaries of its concerns are porous and have extended to take
in a whole range of quality-of-life issues. But the core economic actors – unions
and employers – inevitably have a privileged status over the community and
voluntary sector. 
Social partnership as “flexible network governance” is envisaged as a two-
way but multi-stranded communication system between government and
organised economic and social interests. But the origin of the process is
political and the ultimate decisions in “flexible network governance” rest with
government. Moreover, the framework agreements at the heart of social
partnership are coordinated by the Department of the Taoiseach, which
retains an overview of the process. Control over decision making about what
government defines as its core political issues relating to its electoral
programe, and the budgetary allocation to support them, remains vested in
government.
348 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
02 Hardiman article  25/01/2007  09:49  Page 348Yet governments may need to make these decisions in circumstances that
are not entirely of their own choosing, since the issues channelled through
partnership processes can shift unexpectedly. Problems of democratic
legitimation may well arise here: some organisations may be more vocal than
others, some may be more representative or accountable than others. And
while partnership involves a combination of hard bargaining and deliberative
democracy, the relationship between these networks and the people’s elected
representatives in the Dáil may well be open to some question.
To explore these issues, three themes will be explored in the remainder of
this paper. First, we consider the governance mechanisms of pay agreements,
which are weaker than in a number of other countries practicing wage
coordination. The viability of this model of social partnership continues to
depend on there being sufficient scope for both union and employer interests
to arrive at compromise solutions, based on wage regulation, which can
accommodate the issues that each side defines as central to their interests.
Second, we consider the social policy networks established by social
partnership arising from the “non-pay” elements of the agreements. The
contention here is that partnership structures constitute an important
network of policy formation and influence. Nevertheless, partnership has not
displaced government authority in areas which governments define as central
to their electoral priorities. This is discussed in the third and final section of
the paper. 
IV COORDINATION OF PAY POLICY
At the core of every social partnership deal is an agreement on phased pay
increases expressed in percentage terms. Additional increases in disposable
income have been assured by linking the pay deals with a programme of tax
cuts. The Irish pay deals are not directly imposed by the peak organisations at
the centre. They take the form of headline pay agreements between the
representative bodies of unions and employers, to be implemented by local
agreements within the context of an essentially pluralist and voluntarist
industrial relations system.
Thus, while Ireland’s system of coordinated pay agreements resembles the
other European models, the system of governance is different in important
respects. As Traxler notes, both horizontal and vertical coordination are
required if pay deals are to be stable (Traxler, 2004). Horizontal coordination
refers to the capacity of the major economic actors to arrive at a common
position on pay and other issues, whether at national or at sectoral level.
Vertical coordination refers to the capacity to make deals stick, particularly
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prohibition on industrial disputes. Traxler concludes that peak level
coordination can produce the best macroeconomic outcomes, provided it is
capable of being implemented and that appropriate mechanisms for vertical
coordination are present. However if peak-level coordination is not
enforceable, then national bargaining risks producing the worst economic
outcomes, as local over-the-norm deals proliferate in addition to the peak
bargain. 
The Irish industrial relations system does not have strong mechanisms for
ensuring either horizontal or vertical coordination in Traxler’s terms. The
governance mechanisms in pay policy are a good deal weaker in Ireland than
in countries such as the Netherlands, Denmark, Finland, or Belgium. But
while pay agreements are not strongly institutionalised in the formal sense,
there are informal and flexible mechanisms in place which produce more
coordination that might have been expected in a pluralist, voluntarist system.
We shall look first at the means of horizontal coordination, then of vertical
coordination, then consider the means through which these two dimensions of
coordination interact. 
Horizontal Coordination of Pay Agreements
Social partnership grew out of the interactions between union and
employer leaders in the National Economic and Social Council (NESC) during
the mid-1980s, as they grappled with the problems of the enormous public
debt, exceptionally high unemployment and severe emigration, combined with
ongoing industrial conflict and persistently high inflation. NESC has played a
pivotal role in coordinating the social partners; it also sets the agenda for
successive rounds of pay talks with its periodic framework policy documents. 
Over time, a number of other institutions and interactions have built upon
that early coordinating capacity, for example the National Centre for
Partnership (NCP) in 1997 (a title that was later lengthened to include “and
Performance”, reflecting a broader mandate), which was charged with
encouraging employee involvement, both consultative and financial, and
promoting best work practice models on a voluntary, non-statutory basis. In
2003, the offices of NESC, the National Economic and Social Forum (NESF),
and NCPP were integrated under the umbrella body of the National Economic
and Social Development Organisation (NESDO).
The key to effective communication between government and the main
economic actors is undoubtedly the role played by the Department of the
Taoiseach, most recently by Secretary General Dermot McCarthy, who was
also the chair of NESC for a long spell. Behind the voluntarist structures,
successive governments have actively supported social partnership agree-
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1997a; Visser and Hemerijck, 1997): pay deals are not concluded under the
threat, even implicitly, of a statutory alternative. But it does place government
in a central position from which to exercise leverage on actors or to signal
approval for a new turn in the deal struck. A timely appearance by the
Taoiseach at a stalled moment in the pay talks has been used more than once
to bring negotiations to a successful conclusion. 
The weak economic cleavage structure in Irish party politics means that
there is no political constituency for a strongly market-led solution to
macroeconomic management. The cross-class support base of parties
contributes to the broad agreement across all the major parties since 1987 that
a consensus-seeking process yields the best outcomes. An “open electoral
market” means that party competition is, in European terms, unusually
pragmatic and centrist (Mair, Muller and Plasser, 2004). Moreover, all the
major parties have had a share in power over the period of social partnership.
All parties and all governments have therefore given their approval to the
social partnership process. They would all tend to assess the role of social
partnership in the same positive light as Taoiseach Bertie Ahern when he said
(in the context of union withdrawal from talks about a new agreement, over a
particularly difficult dispute at Irish Ferries): 
Only partnership offers us the degrees of stability, engagement and trust
that are needed if we are to continue to modernise and improve the quality
of life for citizens in a fair and sustainable way. I find it hard to imagine
that any other approach would produce the sort of interlocking policy
responses that would be needed to meet the challenges that lie ahead.
“Questions: Social Partnership Agreements”, 
Dáil Debates, Vol. 611, No. 4, Tuesday 6 December 2005.
Vertical Coordination of Pay Agreements
Even if consultative and consensus-seeking processes are well supported
at national level, this does not necessarily entail that the resulting pay deals
will be stably implemented at sectoral or firm level. The formal mechanisms
for securing compliance with pay deals are weak in the Irish system
(Hardiman, 2000). Nevertheless, other informal means of achieving
coordination should not be underestimated. 
In comparative context, Traxler, Ebbinghaus and others have noted that it
is more difficult to implement pay deals stably if unions are fragmented,
density and coverage are low, if bargaining outside the terms of the agreement
can easily take place at local level, and if pay deals lack legal enforcement. All
of these conditions are present in Ireland.
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with over 40 per cent of total membership spread between public and private
sectors, the Irish trade union movement, with 43 affiliates in the Republic of
Ireland in 2005, is more highly fragmented than is usual among countries
committed to wage coordination policies. There is no means of legally
extending pay deals into all sectors, pay policy is conducted within norms of
voluntarism, and compliance with pay deals or industrial peace clauses is not
legally binding (Ebbinghaus, 2004). 
Trade union density in Ireland is not particularly low, and has been
estimated at about 40 per cent overall. But that figure masks a lot of variation:
union memberships run at over 80 per cent in the public sector but closer to
20 per cent in the private sector. Moreover, many of the multinational
companies (MNCs), particularly high-tech US companies in the computer
software sector, do not recognise or bargain with trade unions. Astudy of firms
established at greenfield sites in Ireland between 1987 and 1997 found that 65
per cent of firms were non-union (Gunnigle, O’Sullivan and Kinsella, 2002).
The same study found that only 14 per cent of US MNCs recognised trade
unions compared with 80 per cent of the European-owned MNCs. And some
US firms that had previously recognised unions were now engaging in “double-
breasting”, that is, adopting non-union policies in new plants opened during
the 1990s (Gunnigle, Collings and Morley, 2005 p. 249).
The mechanisms for bedding down pay deals through workplace
bargaining structures are weaker than in most continental European
countries (Streeck, 1995).1 Roche reports that workplace mechanisms for
employee involvement and consultation have not evolved in tandem with the
growth of national structures (Roche and Geary, 2000).2 Only 12 per cent of
unionised workplaces had significant elements of employee representation
and consultation. Non-unionised workplaces did not seem to have compen-
sated for the absence of union representation with any complementary
systems of employee voice, with only 8 per cent of workplaces reporting the
presence of specific structures. Full compliance in Ireland with the EU
Information and Consultation Directive, which requires regular means of
workplace participation, was postponed until 2008. 
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with the provisions of the partnership agreements. Remarkably, in view of the
organisational weaknesses noted above, there appears to have been relatively
little wage drift in most sectors during most of the 1990s, though in some
sectors such as computer software and construction, labour shortages were
already resulting in above the norm settlements from mid-decade (Baccaro
and Simoni, 2002; Boyle, McElligott and O’Leary, 2004; Ruane, 2002). This
suggests that compliance was more extensive than in the earlier phase of
centralised bargaining in the 1970s. Social partnership has been credited with
making it possible for the rapid growth from 1994 onward to result in more
employment and less inflationary pressure than might otherwise have been
the case. Even allowing for the more uneven compliance trends during the
very rapid growth phase of the late 1990s, and more uneven trends since then,
compliance has evidently been quite extensive. 
Alternatives to Strong Institutionalisation 
How then is coordination achieved, and how is compliance secured? Some
economists point to the buoyant supply of labour during most of the 1990s
which would tend to depress wage inflation and pay drift anyway, without any
need for social partnership agreements (FitzGerald, 1999; Walsh, 1999a;
Walsh, 1999b). Some sociologists would argue that union leaders reneged on
their duty to maximise pay (Allen, 2000). Neither of these explanations will
really do: we need to take actors’ preferences seriously in their institutional
context (Scharpf, 2000). 
In fact there are some mechanisms for ensuring that the governance of pay
is somewhat more solidly grounded than Traxler’s typology would suggest. On
both the union and the employer side, extensive consultation of members’
preferences, and in the case of the unions, legitimation of pay deals by
subjecting them to democratic ballot, underpins voluntary compliance.
(Baccaro, 2002; Baccaro, 2003; Baccaro and Simoni, 2002). During the 1990s,
catch-up and comparability claims did not contribute to wage drift as they had
during the earlier phase of coordinated pay policy in the 1970s. “External”
constraints such as the Maastricht conditions for EMU membership were
internalised into the partnership agreements through NESC. A tightening of
monetary and fiscal policy was supported by unions and employers, and this
also influenced the terms of the pay deals. 
Non-unionised multinationals also faced tight profit margins during the
1990s, and were unlikely to be as willing to concede above-the-norm pay
settlements as might have been the case during the 1970s (Gunnigle, Collings
and Morley, 2005 pp. 251-2). But there is at least anecdotal evidence that
through the networks established by the Irish Business and Employers’
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bargaining process, and that they in turn broadly follow the terms of the
agreements as representing the “market rate”, while securing flexibility in pay
rates through bonuses and other schemes (Roche, 1997). 
The conduct of industrial relations for the duration of the agreements is a
high priority for both unions and employers. Among the issues on the agenda
of the pay talks are workplace conflict over pay and conditions, union
recognition, and workplace participation. Employers have been particularly
concerned to ensure compliance over excess wage drift and to insist on wage
discipline. Unions have pressed for issues such as union recognition and the
review of public sector pay. During 2005, new issues arose about the
exploitation of non-national labour, labour-shedding and outsourcing of work,
protection of employment standards, and the scope of employer concerns over
flexibility. All these issues and more have been built into the pay deals. 
To some degree therefore the process itself, quite apart from its outputs,
acquired legitimacy by commanding the normative allegiance of a majority of
participants (Scharpf, 1997b; Scharpf, 1999). The agreements became not only
the vehicle for securing predictability in pay trends over time, but also the
mechanism for sorting out potentially highly conflictual issues in the
industrial relations arena. However, the consensus-oriented framework
should not be overstated: conflicting preferences are inescapable in labour
relations. Thus, while non-institutionalised vertical coordination may play
some role, we must also look at the formal review and implementation
mechanisms through which the pay deals are bedded down. 
Flexible Governance Networks on Pay and Industrial Relations Issues
The wider institutional framework governing industrial relations was
already well developed at the start of the social partnership process, and
matured further during the 1990s. This is not quite the same as strong
vertical institutionalisation. But it does mean that there is a national-level set
of conflict resolution institutions to which either unions or employers can have
recourse. 
Pay agreements are subject to a series of interim reviews of their
performance. They were monitored continuously by a Central Review
Committee until the mid-1990s. This was replaced by a National
Implementation Body (NIB), which comprises representatives of all the social
partners and has a wider remit. The NIB is credited by all sides as playing a
key role in managing conflict. It acts as a “… sweeper, keeping an eye on
what’s coming down the track”, as one employers’ representative phrased it. It
has worked to defuse conflicts or to channel them into further dispute
resolution arenas. The Labour Relations Commission and the Labour Court,
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and informal, over time, all within a voluntarist framework. A trade union
officer commented that: 
ICTU works with the NIB to keep the lines open. If a group threatens a
breach (of the pay deal), ICTU works hard to keep them committed to the
terms. If anyone wants to go for a deal in excess of these, it has to be
justified very seriously.3
The review mechanisms have provided a channel through which both
union and employer grievances could be recognised and addressed, or pushed
onto the agenda of the next round of partnership talks for a solution.
Pay compliance in a shifting economic environment is one of the biggest
challenges to the employer-union review networks. By the late 1990s, labour
shortages in many sectors put the terms of the agreement (Partnership, 2000)
under severe strain, and above-the-norm settlements became much more
widespread. One senior person on the trade union side commented that: 
ICTU seeks a mandate before going into any agreement, and endorsement
before coming out, and holds member unions to that. ICTU held the unions
to it during the EMS crisis (1992-3), when many employers pleaded
inability to pay. At that time, ICTU could persuade them. But six years
later, they couldn’t persuade their members to hold to a deal, when the
phase of very rapid growth was at its peak. 
Many employers came to the view that while social partnership was
mostly successful, “… the conspicuous exception was PPF (2000-2003)”. Trade
union expectations were still running high, but an international downturn has
changed the business environment. Many believed that unions were engaging
in increasingly aggressive claims which they were pressing hard through the
Labour Court. As one employers’ representative commented:
Where conventionally Labour Court recommendations carried a lot of
weight and respect, now they started to be used in order to further local
negotiations – and the recommendations would not be accepted, but used as
a basis for further claims. This added to the already marked pay drift and
added to competitiveness problems, at a time when cost increases were
running at three times the European average.
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differentiated growth, followed by sharp downturn, in which expectations on
both sides were mismatched and mistimed – could have pulled the very
possibility of pay deals apart. But both sides ultimately preferred to continue
to negotiate within the framework that permitted them to pursue pay and
non-pay issues jointly. 
In addition to conflicts over pay rates, the issue of trade union recognition
proved very difficult, especially in the early 2000s. Union concerns about non-
union firms were not primarily directed toward the US high-tech companies –
as one union official commented:
… they tend to have very good in-house HRM… Intel is not a problem for
the wage rates of North Kildare. But under-cutting and downward
competitive pressures on wages, these are the problems. 
Union recognition had been a source of confrontation in the mid-1990s and
had been referred to a high-level working group under Partnership 2000.
Some in the trade union movement had been pressing for a statutory right to
collective representation; this was opposed by the employers’ federation. The
social partnership working group produced an agreed recommendation about
the process of consultation and mediation that should be followed and that
would eventually result in a legally binding recommendation from the Labour
Court. As one commentator has noted:
The 2004 Industrial Relations Act provides a ready means for expanding
union membership… The stronger enforcement rights contained in…
“Towards 2016” (T16) (during 2006) are worth more than any pay increases
to unions interested in meeting this demand for representation. 
Pádraig Yeates, “Unions must address democratic deficit”, 
Irish Times, 14 July 2006, p. 4.
Another major issue taken out of contention through these channels, to be
sorted out in a separate domain, was that of public sector pay. Grievances in
the public sector had threatened to undermine Partnership 2000 in the late
1990s, as nurses, police and then teachers, sought pay increases significantly
in excess of the terms of the agreement. Special increases awarded to nurses
and police created further difficulties because public sector pay was strongly
driven by well-established relativities and differentials, making it difficult to
control knock-on effects elsewhere. The Public Sector Benchmarking Body,
established in 2000 and reporting in June 2002, awarded an average of 8.9 per
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criticism, the expectation was that this would finally break relativities-based
pay claims in the public sector, and would help speed up the pace of ongoing
change in service delivery and productivity in the public service. 
When Sustaining Progress was agreed in 2003 it had some distinctive
features which underscored the importance for both unions and employers of
being able to conjoin pay issues with industrial relations practices. First, the
pay agreement was only for 18 months’ duration in the first instance: both
employers and unions were wary about locking in to a longer cost-stabilising
agreement. This revealed the weaknesses of the pay governance mechanisms
in a “multi-speed” economy. But it also indicated the continued preference on
both union and employer sides for a negotiated deal over a free-for-all. Second,
the conditions governing compliance were made stricter and the Labour Court
acquired stronger powers to issue binding recommendations in conflicts over
pay (Sustaining Progress, 2003, pp. 67-8). Third, inflation control was made a
priority and passed on to government for response: indeed, the National
Competitiveness Council commented in May 2003 that almost half of recent
price increases were attributable to the cost of government services.5 Fourth,
some legislative strengthening of the process leading to union recognition was
provided for.
An employer spokesman commented that, in the wake of The Programme
for Prosperity and Fairness (PPF) (2000-2003), wage drift was so pervasive,
and conflict over union recognition so intractable, that:
… compliance on pay, and union recognition, either individually or
together, would have collapsed the national agreement altogether. 
The successful negotiation of the two parts of Sustaining Progress
indicates that the formal weaknesses in the governance of pay need not be
fatal. A working solution was found through hard bargaining in which each
side’s grievances were aired and some form of accommodation reached. 
The governance of pay is not as well supported institutionally as in a
number of other European countries; but neither is it as weak as such a
comparison might suggest either. It is flexible because difficult issues can be
revisited and reviewed in successive agreements. The continued commitment
to social partnership as the framework of pay deals cannot be taken for
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and has proven its value. As an employer representative commented: 
Social partnership is a mature structure now. Each side has a sense of how
far they can travel to maintain support for national partnership. There
have been huge benefits; there have also been difficulties, especially in the
recent downturn; which is where the new architecture has become very
important.
Similarly, during 2005 the issue of employment standards and outsourcing
of labour seemed likely to sink any prospect of a successor agreement to
Sustaining Progress. But in the words of a senior civil servant close to the
process:
It is by now quite a robust procedure. It had to be, to deal with these issues.
Social partnership created a momentum which facilitated the referral of
the issue to the Labour Relations Commission and the Labour Court. The
fallout was the creation of a framework to deal with these concerns.
Through social partnership, government was then able to formulate
propositions that would be legally acceptable, and credible, but which
would not threaten core flexibility.
The process is therefore always contested, depending on where each side
sees its advantage lying. For example, one prominent trade union leader
candidly acknowledged, about the issue of union recognition, that:
In other continental European countries – France, say – they have
legislation that is more beneficial to unions, but they have highly regulated
industrial relations systems that are also very constraining. Irish unions
want voluntarism where they are strong and mandatory arbitration where
they are weak.
Yet as a senior civil servant noted:
If employers really thought they would get significantly better cost-
effectiveness, they would get out of social partnership. But this would
probably only follow from an experience with massive levels of
unemployment. So the challenge is to continue to police the system.
Moreover, there are real advantages to government in seeking the direct
input of alternative points of view, where positions are strongly held and in
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standards during 2005 and 2006 for the agreement Towards 2016, a senior
civil servant close to the partnership process commented that:
For government to reach this point, it was important to have the two sides
engaged in strong advocacy of their respective positions. This enabled
government to reach a position that would be both legitimate and effective.
Although questions may be raised about the imperfect democratic
credentials of the partnership process, it is arguably “democratic enough” not
only in its effectiveness but in the claims it can make to democratic legitimacy
in the governance of the pay agreements and related labour market issues.
That said, these claims could clearly be strengthened, particularly in areas
such as trade union membership, representativeness and deliberative
capabilities. 
V THE FLEXIBLE NETWORKS OF SOCIAL POLICY 
Over time, social partnership developed a dense network of working
parties, committees, and task forces, in addition to the more formalised
procedures of monitoring and overseeing the implementation of the pay terms.
Gradually the agreements came to include statements on virtually every
aspect of economic and social policy. 
In neo-corporatist political systems, the justification for linking social
policy issues with pay negotiations is that the former constitute a form of
“social wage” to complement market pay rates. Or it may take the more
contingent form of “competitive” corporatism in which welfare and labour
market reforms of a market-conforming nature may be part of the overall deal. 
Neither of these possibilities seems to fit the Irish experience. There has
been little or no direct linkage of pay deals to expansion of the social wage. And
the problems that arise in improving the Irish welfare state bear little
resemblance to the adjustment problems facing other mature welfare states
(Esping-Andersen, 1999). Yet the cluster of networks around social and
economic policy issues feeds into wider political processes in sometimes
unexpected ways. 
The Social Wage and Social Policy Issues
Although some trade union leaders have striven to raise the profile of the
“social wage”, any prospect of a real trade-off between disposable income and
improvements in social services is, for the most part, marginal to the
negotiations.
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health and social service provision, have not kept pace with rising living
standards, population increase, and growing expectations. Long a “welfare
laggard”, Ireland’s welfare state emphasises targeting and means-testing
(Esping-Andersen, 1999; McCashin, 2004). As a senior civil servant com-
mented:
In Ireland, the middle classes are expected to look after themselves. For a
long time they were excluded from Social Insurance schemes; they are
encouraged to take out private health insurance, pensions and so on. 
This accounts for the reliance on tax incentives for private pensions,
health insurance, income guarantee and other schemes, and for tax subsidies
to home ownership, all of which have been shown to have marked
inegalitarian effects. Less visible is the tendency to graft private provision,
especially in the areas of health and education, onto already existing public
provision. This has given rise to what has been termed a “pay-related welfare
state” in which state-subsidised private purchase can ensure better-quality
health care, education, pensions, and other benefits (Ó Riain and O’Connell,
2000; O’Connell and Rottman, 1992). But if distributive inequities do not
feature strongly in electoral competition, there seems little reason for them to
be a mainstay of partnership negotiations. The principal negotiators in pay
agreements tend to agree that, as one participant put it, “The Irish median
voter clearly favours a low-tax regime”. Notwithstanding increases in gross
public spending during the 1990s, Ireland did move strongly toward a low-tax,
low-spend regime in comparative context (Ó Riain and O’Connell, 2000). As
one prominent individual in the trade union movement commented:
It is easier to construct a grand coalition around the single issue of higher
pay levels, or more disposable income through tax cuts, than around less
tangible and more uncertain future benefits.
Yet the problems of infrastructural investment and service provision also
have a bearing on the quality of life. The trade union movement derives part
of its legitimacy from its promotion of these issues through social partnership
networks. In its online statement about Congress’s “mission”, the Irish
Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU) says that:
Congress will strive to achieve economic development, social cohesion and
justice by upholding the values of solidarity, fairness and equality… .
Through the Social Partnership process, Congress can shape and influence
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and Childcare. (www.ictu.ie)
While many of the non-pay themes in the social partnership agreements
are driven by the trade union movement, others are the concern of the
voluntary and community sector, which was incorporated into the partnership
talks during the mid-1990s. This has broadened the range of interests
represented in the policy networks exponentially. The first social partnership
agreement (Programme for National Recovery (PNR), 1987-1990) was
negotiated with six organisations representing employer, union, and farming
interests. Partnership 2000 increased representation to include ten other
groups, and an umbrella “Community Platform” representing 14 voluntary
sector groups. By the time Sustaining Progress was concluded in 2003, the
social partners included the principal trade union, employer, industry, and
farming interests; 7 voluntary and statutory social interest organisations; and
the Community Platform which represented 26 voluntary sector groups. 
The expanded policy scope of social partnership reached a high point with
the Programme for Prosperity and Fairness (PPF, 2000-2003). This agreement
included five “Frameworks” within which a whole set of policy objectives were
detailed.6 One senior actor estimated that the PPF (2000-2003) had involved
over 60 committees and working groups; another put that estimate at over
100.
Sustaining Progress, negotiated in 2003, was somewhat more modest in
its aspirations. It still set the pay deal in the wider context of macroeconomic
policy, social equity, adaptation to the information society, and other themes,
but the non-pay policy commitments were somewhat more focused this time.7
This agreement accorded priority to ten “Special Initiatives” which included
housing and accommodation; the availability of insurance; migration and
interculturalism; long-term unemployed; educational disadvantage; waste
management; childcare; alcohol and drug misuse; the information society; and
child poverty (Sustaining Progress, p. 23). A Steering Group was set up to
coordinate and develop the work of these groups. Sustaining Progress also set
up other working groups including a Forum for the Construction Industry, and
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agreed in June 2006, in addition to the pay agreement and provisions for the
low-paid, included key points about the establishment of an Office of
Employment Rights Compliance with 90 labour inspectors, labour protection
measures with heavy penalties, a review of pensions policy, and commitments
on social welfare rates, social housing, primary medical care, family carer
policy, among other issues. It is difficult to think of a policy issue that is not
now the subject of some social partnership working group or other. Indeed, the
agreement Towards 2016, concluded in June 2006, set out a ten-year policy
horizon, in line with the NESC framework document that underpinned these
talks (National Economic and Social Council, 2005).
But effective power within the networks is not distributed evenly. The
community and voluntary sector have frequently felt unable to assert their
priorities effectively, unless government was already sympathetic to their
position. They are not even physically present at the pay element of the talks;
indeed the detailed negotiations tend to be conducted not around a table at all,
but indirectly through communications between adjoining rooms. Organisa-
tions wishing to stress the priority of poverty reduction have at times
threatened to withdraw from the talks. In April 2002, the Community
Platform, representing 26 organisations, walked out of the final meeting of the
partnership talks: 
This protest was because the Government had rolled back the equality and
rights agenda by bringing in legislation, which had NOT been agreed in
partnership. The Government did NOT consult with us on legislation
relating to: Disability; Travellers; and Asylum Seekers. (Community
Platform, 2002).
But no agreement was halted or even significantly delayed by such
protests. And some organisations that had not signed up to Sustaining
Progress subsequently found that their government subventions had been
reduced. 
VI FLEXIBLE NETWORK GOVERNANCE IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS
To what degree, then, do these working groups really matter for the
substance of political life, for agenda-setting, for the government’s legislative
programme? A single assessment is difficult to arrive at. We know relatively
little about the details of the Irish policy process. At some moments, on some
policy issues, the partnership working groups have thrown up initiatives that
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issues, the work seems to go nowhere at all. Yet the potential for shaping the
agenda of debate remains considerable. 
The partnership working committees gain added legitimacy because they
function as the principal conduit for the government’s obligation to engage in
consultations and “social dialogue” arising from national membership of the
EU, the UN and other bodies. Ultimately, the networks are only as effective as
government makes them, but governments are also required to be attentive to
the priorities that are articulated through these networks.
Rapid Responses and Transnational Linkages
Social partnership working groups can provide a ready-made forum
through which to engage in consultations which would be necessary in any
case as a consequence of Ireland’s international obligations, for example on
labour market activation schemes or childcare policy. EU and other
commitments do not explain the origins or continuation of flexible network
governance, but they may have helped strengthen and legitimate it. 
The growing European trend toward policy coordination has given an
extra impetus to linking organised interests into the policy process at national
level. The EU’s Open Method of Coordination (OMC) has produced a gradual
change in the way policy priorities are discussed and analysed. The OMC,
initiated in 2000, is an alternative to regulatory policy in areas in which the
EU has no formal competence. It requires the development of National Action
Plans, based on commonly agreed objectives, the  implementation of which is
regularly assessed. The process is intended to “… promote policy cooperation
and transnational exchange of learning and good practice”.8 The exact way
this happens will depend on national variation in institutional structures and
policy styles (de la Porte and Nanz, 2004 pp. 276-280). 
Thus in Ireland, the EU Employment Strategy, and the Action Plan to
which member states are committed as part of this, mainly ran through
existing social partnership networks (Murphy, 2002 p. 115).9 Similarly, the
Irish government’s National Anti-Poverty Strategy (NAPS), set up in 1997 as
a consequence of undertakings given at the UN World Summit for Social
Development in Copenhagen in 1995, was developed by an Inter-Depart-
mental Policy Committee made up of high level officials from a number of
government departments, in consultation and participation with a broad
range of interests, mainly drawing on social partnership channels. The NAPS
Unit subsequently became the Office for Social Inclusion; this is located in the
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of a number of other high-level official groupings cutting across
departments.10 Its work increasingly overlaps with and draws on the work
done through the social partnership working groups.
Involvement in the OMC, in the view of some key actors, has helped to
nudge toward improving the quality of public policy making in Ireland. The
overlapping consultative and reporting mechanisms that link OMC with social
partnership committees help, as several participants note, to keep a focus on
“joined-up government”, to maintain a “whole-of-government” perspective on
multi-agency problems, and to build consensus on problems, targets, and
methods. 
It can be hard to see tangible changes through OMC – but this is not
unique to Ireland and is a widely shared assessment of how OMC works across
the EU (Arrowsmith, Sisson and Marginson, 2004). As a form of “soft law”,
there is no sanctioning mechanism for failure to meet OMC targets. There is
also said to be a less critical process of evaluation at EU-level meetings than
at meetings to assess compliance with UN Conventions. In the latter case,
according to a senior policymaker: 
… countries are really held to account about their compliance, through
tough questioning and adverse publicity. They consult with the NGOs
concerned. There is a big media presence. You have to be very well prepared.
Very different from friendly EU chats. A gentle couple of hours’ exchange is
all that happens. No-one is too hard on anyone else.
And in the words of another senior civil servant:
We are now into an era of Central Bank school of discipline – a reprimand
from the European Central Bank has more teeth than OMC. 
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requirements of the OMC, “… if social partnership did not exist, it would have
to be invented”.
The Political Limits of Network Autonomy
Power in the policy process ultimately resides where there is budgetary
control, or in other words, in the hands of government. It seems that Ireland
ranks well on consultation over policy development and implementation.11 But
there are limits to how much policy discretion is devolved to the social policy
governance networks. Crucially, neither the social partnership Special
Initiatives nor the EU Action Plans are linked into the budgetary process
(Murphy, 2002 p. 113). 
More generally, if issues that are under discussion in partnership
networks are ever to gain the status of actual policies, they need strong
political sponsorship. A senior civil servant comments that:
… there needs to be a strong policy focus. A Minister with a clear agenda
can make a big difference. A Minister can unlock the process.
Ministers, indeed politicians in general, “have an ear to the ground”,
understand electoral preferences, and above all, are accountable to the
electorate on the doorsteps and through the ballot box. Another senior civil
servant commented that: 
It is best if there is a clear policy agenda to work to… This would need to
be bedded down, so that the civil service could be held to account for it. It
would need to be set out with an accountability process… . There is a lot of
institutional inertia otherwise.
Ministers vary considerably in their engagement with policy development.
All government decisions are the collective responsibility of the Cabinet,
though the Minister for Finance as the holder of the purse-strings often plays
a pivotal decision making role. The individual who held this position for the
longest spell in recent times was Charlie McCreevy (Fianna Fáil, 1997-2004).
He exercised ministerial discretion in decision making to a greater degree
than most, and exposed the limits of social partnership’s ability to set the
agenda if this conflicts with the government’s priorities. On some occasions,
the preferences of the social partners ran counter to the party political
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government easily “trumped” social partnership, especially on tax priorities,
and incurred relatively little penalty in the way of protest or non-compliance
by the social partners, or indeed any serious danger to continued participation
in the process.12
Nevertheless, the departure of Charlie McCreevy as Minister for Finance
in 2004 prompted tributes from trade union as well as business interests for
his commitment to supporting social partnership. A commentator in the trade
union movement noted that:
McCreevy seems to have mellowed toward the unions during his time in
office. He was very important in the review of the pay agreement (early in
the term of PPF). He really engaged on macroeconomic issues; he became
an advocate of the social partnership model. 
Fianna Fáil Minister for Finance, Brian Cowen, defended the partnership
process against any suggestion that it is unrepresentative, with a specific
reference to government’s public interest duties:
We’re all there as actors in the economy to try and achieve a consensus on
how to manage the economy and how we create the resources to meet some
of the policy objectives. Over the past 20 years we’ve tried to improve it as
well as recognising some of its constraints and successes. It has been
around social partnership where we have got consensus. Taxpayers are
represented by the Government. 
“Interview of the Week: Brian Cowen”, Irish Times, 
Finance Supplement, 3 February 2006, p. 30.
In similar terms, the Taoiseach, Bertie Ahern, dismissed the view that
social partnership is undemocratic:
Since its beginnings almost 20 years ago, social partnership has been based
on an invitation by the Government of the day to the social partners to join
it in discussing how to jointly develop policies and behaviours which better
serve the needs of our people. It is entirely appropriate and democratic to
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partners. At the same time, the partners fully recognise and accept that the
Government must be able to exercise fully its prerogatives within the
framework of political accountability. The Government entered these
negotiations on the basis of our published programme for Government. 
Dáil Debates, Vol. 623, No. 2, Wednesday 5 July 2006, 
“National Wage Agreements”. 
Government’s responsiveness to the community and voluntary sector, and
especially to representatives of the “poverty lobby”, has been perceived as
waxing and waning as government may need to cultivate one or other section
of the electorate. For example, Fr. Seán Healy, the spokesman for the
Conference of Religious in Ireland (CORI) and a prominent voice on
distributive justice issues in social partnership, was widely believed to have
been politically sidelined by government in the run-up to Sustaining Progress.
But he was warmly welcomed to a Fianna Fáil policy review in the Autumn of
2004, when the government sought to restore its public standing in the wake
of poor local and European election results.
Yet government’s perspective is inevitably coloured by the points of view
channelled through these overlapping networks of consultation. As a senior
civil servant commented:
The trick for social partnership is not to “capture” issues or label
everything, rather to help clarify, to exercise influence. 
Referring to the progress report on the Special Initiatives, published as
part of the mid-term review of Sustaining Progress, the Office for Social
Inclusion commented that:
… the experience from the first phase of work on the initiatives has
underlined their complexity and multidimensional nature... The process
brought greater clarity and focus… to complex issues and it has
highlighted the need for differing or more collaborative ways of working.13
A senior civil servant close to the partnership process summarised the
process of mutual influence as follows:
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bargaining, but about figuring what policy choices are available. If
anything, it is a privileged relationship with government for the social
partners. The wider policy agenda is driven by what government wants to
achieve, tempered by an understanding of what is feasible; it thus provides
an important opportunity for a wide range of interests to influence
government thinking.
All this is surely a vital part of democratic deliberation. However, it is a
process that is not equally available to all. Moreover, it is divorced from
Oireachtas proceedings: neither the framework agendas nor the draft
agreements routinely go before the Dáil. As noted by Deputy Richard Bruton, 
There are two implementation bodies, four research agencies, nine high-
level policy committees and four major progress reports delivered each year.
That presents a stark contrast to the support available to the Oireachtas for
democratically elected representatives to deliver their mandate in crucial
areas of decision making. We must examine developing a proper
relationship between the institutions of social partnership and the
Oireachtas. 
Dáil Debates, Vol. 623, No. 2, Wednesday 5 July 2006, 
“National Wage Agreements: Statements”. 
While these comments reveal a real gap in Dáil procedures, it is in
principle remediable, even though it can be notoriously difficult to reform the
practices of the Irish legislature (Mac Cárthaigh, 2005). This does not
necessarily undercut the legitimacy of the partnership process itself. 
VII CONCLUSION
Social partnership has evolved since the late 1980s. On pay and industrial
relations issues, the deals have proved resilient under varying conditions
(though not yet in prolonged recession). On the broader social policy issues,
the networks of consultation create a flexible system of setting priorities and
channelling policy initiatives into the political process. Social partnership has
become intricately involved with obligations incurred at EU level. The whole
can be understood as constituting a new model of flexible network governance. 
Rather than seeing social partnership as displacing the proper role of
government, we have seen that the policy process still depends centrally on
ministerial initiative and is ultimately subordinate to the electoral priorities
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known deficiencies of the system of public administration, such as in tackling
issues that cut across departments jurisdictions. There are undoubtedly gaps
in democratic legitimacy in this process, especially in areas such as the extent
of trade union membership, the representativeness of the voluntary sector,
and the capacity of the Dáil to debate issues under consideration by
partnership networks. But these do not fundamentally undermine it. Social
partnership has not only acquired a capacity for dealing effectively with
difficult issues but has also strengthened the normative framework for
engaging broad-based social interests in the policy process. In an era when
electoral participation has fallen and parliamentary accountability is more
difficult to enforce, there may be a particular value in having some sort of
mechanism of this kind:
If responsiveness is about substance, accountability is about process, about
the “throughput” that permits citizens to express their views on policy
outputs.
(Papadopoulos, 2003, p. 482).
The core deal on pay and disposable income continues to be the pivot of
social partnership. It is generally acknowledged that “… pay is the glue that
keeps the process together”, as a senior public servant has commented.
Without this, the consultative and representative processes would
undoubtedly be weaker and less significant. But it does shape the nature and
extent of the influence that different actors can wield. 
In comparative perspective, legal and institutional methods of enforcing
implementation of pay agreements in Ireland are quite weak. But the
institutional mechanisms to support and ensure voluntary compliance are
more robust than this might suggest. Social partnership has provided a means
of adjustment to new macroeconomic challenges in a small open economy. But
its contribution to addressing welfare gaps is much more limited, and its
impact on the broader policy environment has been more diffuse. It involves,
as one senior civil servant has noted, “… acknowledging the shared
framework; pre-ordering and disciplining the interests and demands of each
side”. How they identify their interests must necessarily be conditioned to
some degree by their perception of what is feasible within the partnership
process. But they are also constrained in the issues they take up by the wider
political culture that shapes members’ priorities.
The outcomes of social partnership bear some resemblance to the
“competitive corporatism” that has developed in some other European states.
But the institutional framework and the relationships between actors vary
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firmly embedded into the political process than its role in shaping pay trends
might indicate. It has become a robust multidimensional way of managing
many policy issues flowing from the employment context. It is flexible enough
for either government or social partners to seize the initiative in raising
issues. It provides a forum for securing consent for and legitimation of policy
initiatives. Social partnership as a process is now woven into the political
system, and its contribution to shaping the policy agenda, while less visible, is
widely acknowledged. But without the core deal on incomes and industrial
relations, flexible network governance would be likely to become a more
conventional set of interest group lobbies. 
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